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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES N. BENNETT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
DONNA MAE BENNETT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT 1 S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit for divorce brought by Plaintiff-Appellant, 
CHARLES N. BENNETT, against his wife of thirty-one years, 
Defendant-Respondent, DONNA MAE BENNETT. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a full evidential hearing, the Lower Court granted 
a decree of divorce to both parties, set child support, di-
vided the household goods and made an equitable apportionment 
of the only two major assets acquired during the 31 years of 
marriage. The family residence equity and the limited work 
experience and retirement benefits of Defendant were balanced 
by the court against Appellant's Civil Service retirement and 
unrestricted right to "double-dip" benefits from additione;l 
Soci~l Security retirement. 
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RELIEF SOU<;i1 l' OIJ APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have this Honorable Court sustain 
the judgment of the Lower Court and an award of attorney's 
fees and costs of this appeal on the grounds that the record 
made in the Lower Court amply supports the exei:,isc of the 
sound discretion of the Honorable H. Maurice Harding in 
dealing with the complex questions presented by the division 
of property in domestic cases. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent herein will be referred to here-
after as "Wife" and Plaintiff-Appellant as "Husband." 
The Husband and Wife herein were married May 31, 1947, 
(R-3) and the Wife devoted almost a lifetime to the bearing 
and rearing of the parties' four children (R-36) two of 
whom were still minors when the Husband initiated (R-11) a 
complaint for divorce in the Lower Court. (R-66). 
In the property settlement, the Husband's prior disposi-
tion of two family vehicles as a down payment on a newer 1973 
station wagon for his exclusive use was approved together with 
the Husband's spending of the family savings account for his 
own purposes. (R-5 and R-6). The Wife was left with the 
older family sedan as her only means of transportation to and 
from work. (R-5). 
The Wife was awarded the family residence subject to a 
lien in favor of the Husband for $5,000.00, the lien to be 
-/.-
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paid the Husband under the usual conditions but in no event 
lat<~r than January 13, 1986. In addition to the ,1ward of a 
$ 5, tJ 0 0. 0 0 lien on the equity in the parties' residence, the 
Husband was awarded all of his personal contributions to his 
Civil Service retirement, $15,681.95 (P-75), bringing his 
total cash award to $20,681.95. In performing the difficult 
task of apportioning the various equities, the trial court 
considered the $9,603.25 of mortgage debt that the Wife was 
required to pay to protect her equity award (R-47), the dis-
parity of earning power between the Husband's $18,254.00 
annually (R-73) and the Wife's annual income exclusive of 
mandatory overtime ~f $290.00 x 26 pay periods= $7,540.00 
(R-53), the overwhelming difference between the Wife's re-
tirement income not ayailable until January 27, 1994, in 
the sum of $289.20 per month, $3,468.00 annually (R-64) and 
the Husband's $1,215.00 per month, or $14,400.00 annually, 
available at his age 65, or even the Husband's smaller re-
tirement of $1,042.00 per month, annually $12,504.00 (R-77). 
The court received uncontroverted testimony from an expert 
witness that the Husband would also be entitled to draw 
Social Security retirement benefits (R-82). It was the 
Husband's testimony that he had worked a second job in ad-
dition to his Civil Service job for 29 of the 31 years of 
the marriage (R-24). 
What the court had to evaluate was the 49-year old 
-3-
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Husband, in good health (R-76), who has unrestr·icted access 
prior to April 7, 1984 (R-77 and R-80), to $15,681.00 and 
the fact that in approximately 15 months after cetirement 
at age 55 with 37 years and two months of Federal service 
(R-78), will have exhausted hi~ contribution and will1 for 
his remaining life expectency, continue to draw $1,070.00 
per month which he must treat as reportable income for 
Federal and State income tax purposes. If the husband 
elects an option to retire, which is wholly within his own 
control, at age 55, he will draw totally tax-free income of 
$1,070.00 per month until he is approximately 56 1/2 years 
of age anct will have this income supplemented by further 
Social Security retirement benefits upon his achieving a 
suitable age (R-82). The Wife's testimony and documents 
submitted as exhibits was that she will be entitled to a 
retirement of $289.20 per month (R-67). Contrary to the 
statement made in the Husband's Brief that, "She would also 
be entitled to Social Security Benefits," the Wife testified 
that she did not know if this would be in addition to 
Social Security benefits (R-67 and R-68). 
In establishing the level of child support, the court 
had the varying estimates of the Husband's income provid"d 
by the Husband (R-24) at $15,300.00 and his reading c." the 
pay level of a GSB, Step 9 from the Utah Wage Area Schedule 
effective October 29, 1977, of $1.7,302.00 (R-24) and the 
-4-
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final testimony of the Wife's expert witness that effective 
October 5, 1978, the Husband's gross annual salary is $18,254.00 
(R-73). The court had the Husband's unsubstantiated affidavit 
of expenses submitted at trial and the sworn testimony pro-
vided by cross examination of the Husband. The amount owed 
ZCHI, $200.00 (R-29). The amount owed for the Husband's 1973 
station wagon approximately $1,000.00 (R-29). The amount 
owed the federal Employees Credit Union, $900.00 approximately 
(R-29). The amount owed Mental Health, $225.00 (R-29). On 
the question of mandatory deductions for Federal taxes, the 
Husband equivocated ( R- 3 0) • 
The parties' residence was variously appraised at 
$4G,500.00, Husband's appraisal, and $48,300.00, Wife's 
appraisal (R-5), with the llusband testifying in response 
to questions by his counsel he would be satisfied to split 
the difference to arrive at a fair-market value (R-5). The 
fair-market value of equitable solution suggested by Hus-
!Jancl's counsel and accepted by Husband and not subsequently 
controverted by the Wife being $47,400.00 (R-5), the unpaid 
mortgage balance of $9,603.27 (R-46) leaving a total equity 
of $37,796.75. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE TWO PRINCIPAL 
ASSETS ACQUIRED DURING THE PARTIES' THIRTY-
ONE YEAR MARRIAGE. THOSE ASSETS WERE THE 
HUSBAND'S FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT 
AND THE EQUITY IN THE PARTIES' RES I DENCE. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE EXERCISED PROPER DISCRETION 
IN APPORTIONING THE ASSETS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The indisputable evidence presented by Margaret Wood, 
Hill Air Force Base Benefits and Entitlements Officer, was 
that the Husband, upon reaching age 55, would be past his 
maximum with 37 years of Federal service and would be eli-
gible to retire. (R-7 8). Computing his retirement benefits 
on the basis of his October 5, 1978, salary of $18,254.00 
produced a monthly retirement at age 55 of $1, 070 .00 for 
the rest of the Husband's life. The same witness testified 
that at age 65, the Husband would be eligible to receive a 
retirement equal to 80% of his base pay which, if the Husband 
received no further increases in pay, would be an annual sum 
of $14,400.00. (R-78). 
The expert witness testified that the Husband's retire-
ment benefits could start as early as May 7, 1984, at which 
point the Husband would be beyond his maximum. The testimony 
was that the Husband's retirement income would be tax free 
until he had been repaid the $15, 861.95 which he had con-
tributed by payroll deduction. (R-78). 
-6-
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The trial judge s ta tecl that he was considering the 
Husbetnd's contributions and "the money that had been paid 
into Civil Service retirement which the Husband could only 
get if he li veu long enough." (R-94). 
Uteth stettutory authority for the trial court taking 
into consicleration the Husband's present interest in an 
annuity income to be paid him beginning in May of 1984 is 
fou11J. in 30-3-5 UCA 1957 as amended: 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court 
may mcike such orders in relation to the chil-
dren, property, and the parties and the main-
tenance of the parties and children as may be 
equitable***" 
The most recent case squarely on point which also delt 
with the consideration of a Federal retirement plan having 
a value of $29, 000 .00 is Englert v. Englert, 576 P2d 1274 
at 1276 (February 1978). Interpreting 30-3-5 UCA 1957 this 
court said, 
"It is our opinion that the correct view under 
our law is that this encornpcisses all of the as-
sets of every nature possessed by the parties 
whenever obtained and from whatever source de-
rived and that this includes such pension fund 
or insurance. These should be given due con-
sideration along with all other assets, income 
earnings and the potential earning capacity of 
the parties in determining what is the most 
practical, just and equitable way to serve the 
best interests of the parties and their chil-
dren. (Citing Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 
296 P2d 977). II 
'l'ha t a Federal Civil Service retirement plan is property 
\Illich the parties possess and, in the present case, which was 
dCCJUirc.t <lur incr tile 31 yecirs of tl1eir marriage cannot be 
.:.0ri011~;J.y r1i~~putec1. 
-7-
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The trial judge had clear evidence of the differences 
be tween the parties' incomes. From the testimony provided by 
the expert witness from Hill Air Force Base, the Husband's 
annual salary as of October 5, 1978, was $18,254.00. 
The Wife provided evidence which was not controverted at 
trial that her gross, bi-weekly pay was $290.00. The true 
nature of the disparity between the parties' future earning 
capacity or retirement income was illustrated by the Hill 
Air Force Base expert who testified that the Husband's re-
tirement income at age 65 would be 80% of salary. On a 
current salary basis, the court verified that the Husband 
would, at age 65, be entitled to an annual retirement 
benefit of $14,400.00. (E-78). The Wife, on the other 
hctnu, woulu ctchieve ct max.inium of $289.00 monthly retirement 
based on a projected salary still five years in the 
future. The Wife must wait until May 27, 1994, before such 
benefits would be payable. (R-67). At present the Wife is 
49 years old. There is, then, a substantial record to sup-
port the modest adjustment of equity which the trial judge 
made between the parties. 
The question of the 49-year-old Husband being disabled 
is raised here for the first time on appeal. At trial, the 
Husband affirmed that while his health was basically good, 
he was not able to work sixteen hours per day as he alleged 
he had done up until two years before he initiated his com-
-8-
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plaint for divorce. The trial judge who heard the Husband's 
voice inflections and observed his demeanor in response to 
questions from his counsel, believed the Husband when he 
asserted that his health was good. Two excerpts from the 
record are illustrative. (R-22). 
Counsel (for Husband): "Basically your health 
is good, but not such that you could work 
sixteen hours a day?" 
Husbcincl: "Well, not really. I have emphysema, 
Pete, some, yes, and it bothers me quite a 
bit. II 
At a later point when counsel for the Wife attempted to 
elicit from the Hill Air Force Base Benefits and Entitlements 
Officer information regarding whether or not the Husband 
would gain additional advantages by seeking a disability re-
tirement, the Husband's counsel again affirmed the Husband's 
good heal th. (R-7 6). 
Counsel (for Wife): "If he were to take a 
disability retirement today, can you tell 
me what his benefits would be?" 
Counsel (for Husband): "It's irrelevant. 
Has no bearing. There's no testimony be-
fore this court as to the plan of taking 
ci disability. Quite the contrary. His 
heal th is good." (Emphasis supplied-.-)-
'.Ch8 court: "Sustained." 
Ttw nusband appears to object to the trial judge con-
sidering any value to him in his Federal Civil Service re-
tirement bGyond that expressed by the $15,861.95 which he 
paid into the plan. The Husband is, on the other hand, 
-9-
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quite willing to claim half of the original $12,500.00 paid 
for the home, half of the improvements and half of the 
appreciation. (R-5). Such a position is clearly ambivalent, 
The record strongly supports the division made by the trial 
judge. ( R- 3 3 an::l R- 3 4) • 
Tho court: "How much did your home cost?" 
Husband: "Originally?" 
The court: "Yes." 
Husband: "I think we paid twelve-five originally 
for the home." 
The court: "It is now appraised for nearl ·four 
times that.·" (Emp asis supplied. 
Husband: "Yes." 
The court: "Have you made lots of improvements?" 
llusl.J<.md: "We put on a family room at the expense 
of over thirteen thousand: new roof, new 
siding, storm windows and doors, a new 
fence in back, cinder block fence." 
The court: "Very well, thank you." 
The trial judge exercised logical discretion in 
dealing with the complex decision necessary to arrive at 
an equitable apportionment of the parties' two major as-
sets, and his judgment should be sustained by this court. 
At page seven of the Husband's Brief, it is asserted 
that the Wife's Telephone Company retirement of $3,468.00 
per year will be supplemented by Social Security. The 
Husband adduced no such evidence at trial. The only re-
ference to the question in the trial record is a statement 
-10-
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from the Wife on cross examination that she does not know 
whether or not her retirement plan is coordinated with 
Social Security. (R-67 and R-68). 
The trial judge demonstrated a grasp of both of the 
parties' potential for additional income from Social 
Security. 'l'he question of the value of the Husband's 
contributions to Social Security during the 29 years he 
worked a second job was before the court at R-79. 
The court: "I will take judicial notice that 
Social Security is 6.15%." 
Counsel (for Husband): "I think it's a little 
higher than six now." 
The court: "6.15." 
Counsel (for Husband): "Would the court also 
take judicial notice that back in 1947 it 
was probably about 3 1/2%?" 
'£he court: "It was a whole lot less." 
Counsel (for Husband) : "Yes." 
The court: "It starts out, I think, at one 
percent." 
The Hill Air Force Base Benefits and Entitlements Officer 
testified regu.rding the Husband's right to draw both Civil 
Service retirement and Social Security as follows: (R-8 2) , 
counsel (for Wife) : "To your knowledge, is 
there anything in the Federal Retirement 
Regulations that would preclude an employee 
from drawing both his Federal retirement, 
at over $1,200.00 a month, and whatever 
Social Security he might be eligible for?" 
!1rs. woods: "He may draw both, sir, if he's 
eligible for both." 
-11-
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Counsel (for Wife) : "Are you sure of that?" 
Mrs. Woods: "Yes , sir , I am. " 
Considering all of the facts, the modest award made by 
the trial judge to the Wife, who had not sought to terminate 
the marriage nor threatened the Husband, takes into account 
the re la ti ve guilt of the parties as it was perceived by the 
trier of fact from statements and demeanor of the parties. 
It was the Ilusband who indicated to the court that the matter 
would go forward with each party alleging minimum grounds. 
( R-2) • The lower court's approval of the agreement as to 
grounds precludes the issue raised for the first time on 
appeal as to the relative guilt or innocence of the parties 
for the collapse of the marriage. The Husband having raised 
the issuu of relative quil L, here should be noted that when 
he was qucs tioned by his counsel regarding the Wife's pos-
session of his handguns and arrununition, the Husband did not 
deny having threatened the Wife. The Husband limited his 
denial to having threatened the Wife with a gun. 
Counsel (for Husband): ·"Have you ·ever 
threatened your wife physically, or 
threatened her with a gun, that she 
would have any fear of that?" (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
Husband: "Not with a gun, no. Bes ides, 
the ammunition that she has taken with 
this pistol doesn't fit this pistol, 
anyhow. So the ammunition that she 
(R-15). 
took was 500 rounds of .357 ammunition, 
and the pistol she took was a .22 calibre, 
so they won't even fit." 
The Wife abided by the prior agreement as to minimum 
-12-
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grounds and offered no detailed history of marital conflict 
or physical violence relying on the trial judge's opportunity 
to observe the demeanor of both parties as they gave their 
testimonies. 
The trial judge followed the established case law in 
ap[Jraising all of the circumstances of the parties. The 
case on which both par ties rely is Wilson v •. Wils·on, 5 Utah 
2d. 79, 296 P 2d 177 (1956) at page 979 and 980. 
"In doing so it is necessary for the court to 
consider, in addition to the relative guilt or 
innocence of the par ties, an appraisal of all 
of the attendant facts and circumstances; the 
duration of the marriage; the ages of the parties; 
their social positions and standards of living; 
their health; consideration relative to children; 
the money and propert¥ they possess and training 
and their present and otential incomes.·" (Citing 
for ot er lists o factors to e consi ered p·inion 
v. Pinion, 92 Utu.h 255, 67 P2d 265; MacDonald v. 
MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P2d 1066, 1071). 
( t:rnplws is supplied.) 
'l'lw llusband cites in his Brief the case of Martinett v •. 
l'lartine tt, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P2d 821 (1958), for the propo-
'.o i Li01t tit, it the trial j uclyc wus unjust in his ruling. The 
Husband's Brief admits at page 9 that equity and justice are 
de tcrmincd by the facts of each case. In the present case, 
eviclc11cc '"1ppor- ts the determine\ tion made by the trier of fact. 
1.h<' nLl tion.-i l InsurancG Commissioners Standard Ordinary 
i•iortality Table, 1958, indicates a life expectancy at the 
Husband's age 55 of an additional 21 years; By exercising 
his option to retire at age 55, the Husband will receive a 
-13-
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monthly income of $1,070.00. In the first fifteen months 
after re tiring, the Husband will have withdrawn an amount in 
excess of his present contribution of $15,281.95. Every 
fifteen months thereafter the Husband will be paid an ad-
ditional $16,050.00 In less than three years from age 55 
to 58, l:he f!uslJand will have withdrawn $32,100.00 in monthly 
retirement benefits. The total potential withdrawal over 
the 21 yec1rs of the Husband's life expectancy exceeds 
$269,000.00. The taking into account by the trial judge of 
money thil t the BuslJand could receive only if he lives long 
enough is well founded in the evidence adduced at trial 
and should be sustuincd. Nothing in Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis, 
14 Utuh 2cl 273, 382 P2d 412, suggests any other result. 
'£Ile lluslJc.tnd seeks to charucterize the trial judge's 
bu lancing of the relative equities between the parties in 
l:lte property settlement as il deduction of $15,682.00 from 
the Husband's share of the $38,000.00 equity in the parties' 
home. (lZ-89). It would be vustly more accurate to character-
ize the settlement as the lower court's view of the present 
value of tl1e Husband's future benefits from Federal Civil 
Service retirement. ( R- 9 2 and R- 9 4) • 
'l'he fact that the Husband will have been repaid all of 
his contributions to Civil Service retirement and his re-
maining income will become reportable income for State anJ 
Federal tax purposes within as little as fifteen months 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
after he retires shows the wisdom of the trial judge in 
taking into account "money 1·1hich he will receive only if 
he lives long enough." (R-80). It is more advantages to 
have a large retirement income on which one pays State and 
Fe~eral tax than a small income from whatever source that 
provides a bare existence but is tax exempt. 
POINT II 
'l'lll:: 'l'lUAL COURT'S AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT 
MEETS BOTH STATUTORY AND EVIDENTUARY RE-
QUIREMENTS, IS EQUITABLE AND SHOULD BE 
SUSTAINED. 
The Utah Uniform Civil Liabilities for Support Act 
specifies, without imposing a limitation, certain matters to 
be considered by a trial judge in setting a level of support. 
78-45-7 (2) UCA 1957 as amended 1977 provides in part: 
"***the court in determining the amount of 
prospective support, shall consider all rel-
evant factors including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation 
of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obliger for 
the support of others." 
The trial record shows that in addition to the factors 
enumerated above, the court had evidence as to the marital 
debts assumed by each of the parties albeit the Husband did 
not supply evidence as to whether or not the monthly pay-
mcnts of marital debts which he claimed would last for more 
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than one month at the rate of repayment claimed. The 
ability of each of the parties to earn was before the court 
in the case of the Husband on his recollection that he earned 
$15,300.00 annually, then upon his reading of his salary froo 
the chart at $17,302.00 (R-24) and finally on the testimony 
of the Hill Air Force Base Benefits and Entitlements Offic~ 
that the Husband's earnings as of October 5, 1978, were 
$18,254.00. (R-7 3). 
Evidence given by the Wife established the family's 
living standard, her regular and limited overtime earnings 
and t:l'E needs of the children. In particular, the uncon-
tcs tcd evidence from the Wife was that the family's basic 
necessity budget was currently being supplemented by the 
eJ.n1inys o[ tile parties' 15-year-old son. The record and 
statute fully support the trial judge's increase of the 
prior temporary order for support from $300.00 per month 
to a total award of $350.00 per month. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Husband has failed to meet his burden of proof re-
garding his cli.lim that the trial judge abused his discretion 
in making an award of $5,000.00 as the Husband's share of ilie 
equity in the parties' residence rather than the $11,159.00 
which the Husband seeks on appeal. The record made in the 
lower court is totally consistent with prior case law and 
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fully supports the exercise of discretion by the trial judge 
in evaluating the money that the Husband will receive from 
Civil Service retirement in addition to that which he has 
paid by way of employee contributions. 
The increase in child support from $300.00 per month 
total to 5350.00 per month taken together with the clear 
evidence tlla t the Wife was working to support the children, 
the llusbcincl had received an increase in annual salary of 
nearly $1,000.00 more than at the time the temporary order 
was entered, and the children were in need of additional 
support for necessities not possible at $300.00 per month 
is on Cl LL foui:-s with tile mos l recent pronouncements of this 
CO\LLL. 
'l'ilcc llu:~J_ic1nu hc1s cons.Lrucd the sµecificity with which 
tile trictl judyc stated tl1e basis for his award of more of 
the el1ui ty in the par ties' home to the Wife than to the 
Husband as a challenge to this court. The particularity 
o[ the tr ictl judge in apportioning the two principal assets 
becween the parties is more accurately an invitation to 
bu th counscd to consiuer carefully the case of Englert V. 
lcnqlc1-t, 576 P7.c1 127'1 ilt 1276 (February 1978). 
In vie1-1 of the dispropoi:-tionate financial circumstances 
of the parties, the fact that the Husband takes the position 
o[ plaintiff in seeking to dissolve a marriage of 31 years, 
iHicl the fact that the instant case is so completely within 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the holding of the Englert case, it is requested that the 
sum of $500.00 as attorney's fees on appeal plus costs on 
appeal be awarded the Wife. 
For the reasons previously set out in the several 
paragraphs above, the judgment of the District Court should 
be affirmed in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'I 
,,: l. 
'u ~{ ·., J, 
J. Val Roberts " 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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